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NONCONSENSUAL DEEPFAKES: DETECTING AND
REGULATING THIS RISING THREAT TO PRIVACY
NATALIE LUSSIER*
ABSTRACT
This paper surveys the emerging threat of deepfake technology, largely
in relation to nonconsensual deepfake pornography. Part I of this Article
provides an understanding of deepfake technology and its increasing
threat to privacy. Part II then canvases the steps that public and private
entities are taking to combat these threats. Lastly, Part III explores legal
avenues for victims and engages potential legislative solutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Deepfake technology uses artificial intelligence to manipulate human images,
yielding fabricated images and videos that appear strikingly authentic. Deepfakes
are a rapidly increasing presence on the internet: in 2020, the quantity of deepfake
videos increased to six times that of the year prior.1 This number will continue to
climb with the increasing availability of deepfake technology and ease in which
these images and videos are created.
The concern surrounding deepfake technology focuses on cybercrime in
relation to the use of one’s images and privacy, and this relatively new area of crime
incites a new spin on a subject that many women are too familiar with—
nonconsensual pornography. Cybercriminals can and are using deepfake
technology to create sexually explicit photos and videos of individuals,
predominantly women, and in turn using these videos to threaten, extort, and
humiliate.2
With the lack of knowledge about deepfakes, it is unsurprising that those in
the legislature are only recently starting to understand and care about the effects
of both nonconsensual pornography and deepfake technology.3 Consequently,
legislation that is an amalgamation of the two is scarce: nonconsensual
pornography proposals overlook the artificial intelligence subset and deepfake
technology proposals are typically tailored to election AI. Neither proposal
considers the most prominent category of deepfakes: nonconsensual deepfake
pornography.
Companies, researchers, and organizations are also recognizing this threat to
privacy. For example, Amsterdam-based intelligence company, Sensity, has
developed tools to help the public determine the authenticity of images and
videos.4 But what about the websites that hold this media—what is their burden?
Researchers seek to develop and provide tools for these sites because the solution
is greater than just public knowledge or offender liability: websites that house these

1. In 2019 the internet held an estimated 15,000 deepfake videos. And of these videos, 96% were
pornographic in nature, with exclusively female targets. See HENRY AJDER ET AL., THE STATE OF DEEPFAKES:
LANDSCAPE, THREATS, AND IMPACT 1–2 (2019), https://sensity.ai/reports/. This number grew to 85,000 by
December of 2020, almost six times that of the year before. See How to Detect a Deepfake Online: Image
Forensics and Analysis of Deepfake Videos, SENSITY: DEEPFAKE DETECTION (Feb. 8, 2021), [hereinafter How
to Detect a Deepfake Online], https://sensity.ai/how-to-detect-a-deepfake/.
2. Deepfakes and Cheapfakes: The Biggest Threat is Not What You Think, TRTWORLD (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/deepfakes-and-cheap-fakes-the-biggest-threat-is-not-what-youthink-43046.
3. One expert opined that “80% [of people] have no idea what a deepfake is.” Karen Hao,
Deepfake Porn Is Ruining Women’s Lives. Now the Law May Finally Ban it, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/12/1018222/deepfake-revenge-porn-coming-ban/.
4. Forensic Deepfakes Detection, SENSITY, https://sensity.ai/deepfakes-detection/ (last visited Oct.
15, 2021).
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altered images and videos need to take action. 5 This Article seeks to address
website liability, specifically relating to nonconsensual pornography, as well as
explore current legislation, propose new legislation, and assess the impact of sitting
idle.
II. UNDERSTANDING DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS INCREASING THREAT TO
PRIVACY
A. Deepfake Technology: A Rising Risk
For decades people have relied on video and audio recording, but deepfake
technology now casts doubt on the ideology that seeing is believing. There is no
reliable way to currently detect deepfakes, and researchers have a catch-22 in
exploring solutions—the technology utilized for detection can also be used for
creation.6 “As of now, we lack automated ways to detect Deepfakes in a reliable
and scalable fashion,” Dawn Song, Professor at the University of California Berkeley
said, “[i]t will be an arms race between those that create Deepfakes and those [sic]
seek to detect them.”7
Deepfake technology uses the likeness of others to manipulate human
images, producing fabricated images and videos that appear strikingly authentic to
the average viewer.8 In the most modern fashion, the term “deepfake” was first
coined in 2017 by a Reddit user of the same name who shared pornographic videos
that used face-swapping technology.9 With the simple creation of a username and
a handful of posts, this rapidly expanding technological advancement was titled.
In 2019, Sensity, a company dedicated to researching deepfakes and their
evolving threats, released a report titled The State of Deepfakes: Landscape,
Threats, and Impact.10 This report found that the number of deepfake videos on the
internet doubled from 2018 to 2019.11 And of these videos, ninety-six percent were
pornographic in nature and almost exclusively targeted women.12 The number of
fake online videos has grown drastically since this report, roughly doubling every

5. Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We Are Outgunned’, THE
WASH. POST. (June 12, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/12/topai-researchers-race-detect-deepfake-videos-we-are-outgunned/.
6. Chenxi Wang, Deepfakes, Revenge Porn, and the Impact on Women, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2019, 7:39
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chenxiwang/2019/11/01/deepfakes-revenge-porn-and-theimpact-on-women/?sh=64ed80a71f53.
7. Id.
8. Mika Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT.
REV. 39, 39 (2019).
9. Id.
10. AJDER ET AL., supra note 1, at foreword.
11. Id. at 1.
12. Id. at 1–2.

2022

DEEPFAKE PORNOGRAPHY: DETECTING AND
REGULATING THIS RISING THREAT TO PRIVACY

355

six months.13 As of December 2020, Sensity has detected about 85,000 fake videos,
almost six times what the number was the year prior.14
Deepfakes are quickly integrating into the mainstream internet. Most
recently, a conversation about deepfakes infiltrating social media was sparked by a
series of videos posted on TikTok by Tom Cruise, except it was not Tom Cruise.15 It
was an actor that looked similar to Cruise, filmed by creator Chris Ume, and then
manipulated by Ume to appear to be Cruise.16 The intent behind these videos was
not malicious, as demonstrated by the account’s username “deeptomcruise.” 17
Ume said that the goal of these videos was to draw attention to deepfakes and
advocate for their regulation.18 One of many reasons that a need for regulation
exists is due to the ease by which these videos can be created—anyone can do it.
i. GAN Technology: Anyone Can Do It
Deepfake algorithms are open source, which makes them easy to access for
anyone with rudimentary programming skills.19 In short, no expertise is needed. The
most popular algorithms available are Generative Adversarial Networks (“GAN”),
originally proposed by Ian Goodfellow.20 GAN’s make up includes two neural
networks that contest with each other, with one network operating as a
“generative” model that is trained to generate new examples—similar to a
counterfeiter producing false currency.21 The other network is the “discriminatory”
model, which is designed to classify whether data is synthetic or original, similar to
police attempting to detect the counterfeit currency.22
So, say a user wants their GAN to draw a cat, the user would give the GAN
various images of cats in order to teach it what cats look like. 23 The GAN would then
compare its generated cat to the images, and in time, the algorithm would learn

13. How to Detect a Deepfake Online, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Tom Knowles, Deepfakes Are Risky Business, Warns Creator of Viral Tom Cruise, THE TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2021, 5:00 PM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/deepfakes-are-risky-business-warnscreator-of-viral-tom-cruisex2zmkqc8h?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1614964116.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Wang, supra note 6.
20. Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets, in 1 ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING SYSTEMS 27 (2014).
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id.
23.Donovan Alexander, Artificial Intelligence Creates Better Art Than You (Sometimes), INTERESTING
ENG’G (April 11, 2021), https://interestingengineering.com/artificial-intelligence-creates-better-artthan-you-sometimes.
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how to create a cat.24 In fact, this has already been done, and a site houses endless
GAN-generated cat images.25 With each refresh of the page comes a different cat,
and none of these cats actually exist.26
GAN has also been used less innocuously. In late 2018, a GAN-generated
painting was sold at a fine auction house for $432,500—forty-two times the initial
estimates.27 This “painting” replicated a nineteenth-century portrait of a man and
was created by being fed 15,000 portraits between the fourteenth and twentieth
centuries.28 The painting seems authentic until closer inspection, where the work
appears unfinished and the faces unclear. 29
Additionally, researchers from the University of Helsinki and Copenhagen
used a GAN to generate images of false faces that it knew users would find
attractive.30 They attempted this objective by feeding the technology 200,000
images of celebrities.31 This AI then produced hundreds of images of imaginary
people, which were in turn shown to a group of study participants while researchers
monitored their brain activity.32 As predicted, brain activity increased when
participants viewed an image of a face they were attracted to.33 Unlike the study
itself, the drive behind it was far from surface-level beauty standards.34 Tuukka
Ruotsalo, an associate professor at the University of Helsinki, stated, “[t]his could
help us to understand the kind of features and their combinations that respond to
cognitive functions, such as biases, stereotypes, but also preferences and individual
differences.”35 As shown, deepfakes can help advance psychological and social
sciences, but what is the psychological effect of knowing these deepfakes exist at
all?
ii. The Liar’s Dividend
The average person cannot discern deepfake from real. One 2018 study
published by six professors in Germany, Italy, and France found that people only

24.Id.
25. Lindsey Romain, This Website Creates Photos of Cats That Don’t Really Exist, NERDIST (Apr. 13,
2021, 7:53 AM), https://nerdist.com/article/this-cat-does-not-exist-website-ai-fake-cats/.
26. Id.
27. Alexander, supra note 23.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Vanessa Bates Ramirez, This AI Uses Your Brain Activity to Create Fake Faces It Knows You’ll
Find Attractive, SINGULARITY HUB (Mar. 18, 2021), https://singularityhub.com/2021/03/18/this-ai-usesyour-brain-activity-to-create-fake-faces-it-knows-youll-find-attractive/.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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correctly identify fakes in about fifty percent of cases, which is no better than simply
guessing.36
This gives way to the “liar’s dividend,” the idea that the existence of deepfakes
creates distrust, casting doubt on what could very possibly be real.37 With
mainstream deepfakes, anyone can claim a released tape of them displaying
prejudice or stating anything unfavorable was fake, and it would be difficult to know
the difference. This is particularly concerning for public officials. Recall the infamous
Hollywood Access tape where former president Donald Trump was recorded
disparaging women, in turn causing a significant hit to his campaign.38 One may
argue that the impact of this recording would have been mitigated if voters or the
former president questioned the authenticity of the video.
iii. Deepfake Concerns with Elections, Stock Markets, and Courtrooms
Continuing with political AI, fake videos of politicians displaying prejudice or
accepting bribes can sabotage elections.39 This should concern public officials given
the creation of these videos are not difficult due to the vast amount of media that
exists of public officials on the internet.40
There have also been concerns that deepfakes will be used to manipulate the
stock market through deepfake material events, such as false mergers or
catastrophic financial losses that never happened.41 Stock markets are volatile by
nature, and the existence of deepfakes aggravate this base volatility. This was
demonstrated in 2011, when the Associated Press’ Twitter was targeted and
hacked, resulting in a tweet stating that there was an explosion in the White House
and former President Barack Obama was injured.42 The Dow Jones immediately
plummeted and the S&P 500 lost $136.5 billion in market capitalization.43
Additionally, in the legal context, deepfakes can call into question courtroom
evidence. The New Evidence Rule 902(13) allows authentication of records
36. Rössler et al., FaceForensics: A Large-Scale Video Dataset for Forgery Detection in Human
Faces, ARXIV, Mar. 24, 2018, https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09179.pdf.
37. STEPHEN PROCHASKA ET AL., CTR. FOR AN INFORMED PUB., UNIV. OF WASH., DEEPFAKES IN THE 2020
ELECTIONS AND BEYOND: LESSONS FROM 2020 WORKSHOP SERIES (2020), https://cpb-use1.wpmucdn.com/sites.uw.edu/dist/6/4560/files/2020/10/CIP_Deepfakes_Report_Extended.pdf.
38. Lawrence Goodman, How the Access Hollywood Tape Affected the 2016 Election,
BRANDEISNOW (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.brandeis.edu/now/2020/september/access-hollywoodgreenlee.html.
39. Westerlund, supra note 8, at 39–40.
40. Id.
41. Prajakta Pradhan, AI Deepfakes: The Goose Is Cooked?, U. ILL. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 4, 2020),
https://illinoislawreview.org/blog/ai-deepfakes/.
42. Shawn Langlois, This Day in History: Hacked AP Tweet About White House Explosions Triggers
Panic, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 23, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-day-inhistory-hacked-ap-tweet-about-white-house-explosions-triggers-panic-2018-04-23.
43. Id.
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“generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result” if
“shown by the certification of a qualified person.”44 So, a video can be
authenticated by having the person who took the video, or was present for the
video, testify to the accuracy and validity of this video.45 An individual would have
to perjure himself or herself if there was knowledge that the video was inaccurate
or a deepfake.46
What is concerning about this Rule is it allows video evidence to be
authenticated by a witness who is familiar with the suspect in the video, and this
witness can mistakenly testify that the suspect in the video is who he or she appears
to be.47 Since deepfakes are difficult to detect, even a close relative who knows the
suspect in question would be at risk of false authentication.48 Many courts also use
the “silent witness” approach to authentication, which allows for evidence when
no human witnessed the incident, such as security footage of a break-in.49 This also
opens the door in a dangerous way for deepfakes.
Again, this is not a future issue—this is happening now. Already, people
accused of possessing child pornography often claim that it's computer-generated,
says Hany Farid, a digital forensics expert at UC Berkeley. 50 “I expect that in this and
other realms, the rise of AI-synthesized content will increase the likelihood and
efficacy of those claiming that real content is fake.”51 Once a video is seen, its effects
on the jury can be irreversible. Conversely, juries could fall victim to the liar’s
dividend if lawyers erroneously claim that media against their client is fake.
As illustrated, deepfake technology has found its way into various areas,
including, but not limited to, elections, market manipulation, and the legal system.
However, the most prominent subset remains undiscussed: nonconsensual
deepfake pornography.
B. Where Deepfake Technology Meets Nonconsensual Pornography
Deepfake incitement has recently emerged with election tampering, but for
women, the trauma of deepfakes has been present for years. Danielle Citron,
Professor of Law at Boston University and author of Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, told
Sensity that deepfakes are especially harmful to women:
Deepfake technology is being weaponized against women by inserting
their faces into porn. It is terrifying, embarrassing, demeaning, and
44. FED. R. EVID. 902(13).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Theodore F. Claypoole, AI and Evidence: Let’s Start to Worry, IX THE NAT’L L. REV. 1 (2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ai-and-evidence-let-s-start-to-worry.
48. Wang, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50.
Kaveh
Waddell, The Deepfake Threat
to
Evidence, AXIOS (Oct.
12,
2019),
https://www.axios.com/deepfakes-evidence-law-f36e6538-f075-496d-bb56-64fcc29f21ef.html.
51. Id.
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silencing. Deepfake sex videos say to individuals that their bodies are
not their own and can make it difficult to stay online, get or keep a job,
and feel safe.52
Ninety-six percent of online deepfake videos are pornographic in nature and almost
exclusively targeted women.53
This issue may be almost completely gender exclusive, but it is not region
exclusive. As of 2019, ninety percent of general deepfake videos on YouTube
specifically featured Western subjects.54 However, non-Western subjects were
featured in almost one-third of videos on specifically deepfake pornography
websites, indicating that deepfake pornography is not restricted to the West, but
quickly becoming a global issue.55
Unfortunately, this type of AI targets victims of all ages. In 2019, a deepfake
bot was uncovered that used GAN technology to “undress” women, and many of
these images were in reality underage children.56 For no fee, someone could upload
an image of a clothed women and receive a photo back of her with the clothes
seemingly removed.57 As of July 2020, over 100,000 women’s images were used. 58
The victims come from a broad range of countries, including Russia, the United
States, Argentina, and Italy.59 Most of the images uploaded were provided from
someone the user knows in real life or from Instagram. 60
Another prominent threat is utilizing deepfakes as harassment to silence
female journalists. For one journalist,61 what started with a series of fake
xenophobic tweets in retaliation of a speech on child sex abusers quickly evolved
to a nonconsensual deepfake pornographic video.62 “Within hours, I was receiving
screenshots of the video on my WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook,” the journalist
said in an interview with The World public radio: “I felt like I was naked for the
52. AJDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 6.
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. Karen Hao, A Deepfake Bot is Being Used to “Undress” Underage Girls, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 20,
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/20/1010789/ai-deepfake-bot-undresses-womenand-underage-girls/.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The names of the victims in this section have been left out due to the sensitive nature of the
content discussed.
62. See Internet ‘Deepfakes’ Threaten Truth and Reality, THE WORLD (June 13, 2019, 5:15 PM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-13/internet-deepfakes-threaten-truth-and-reality; see also Rana
Ayyub, I Was the Victim of a Deepfake Porn Plot Intended to Silence Me, HUFFPOST: LIFE LESS ORDINARY
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/deepfakeporn_uk_5bf2c126e4b0f32bd58ba316.
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world. I was throwing up, I was in the hospital, I had palpitations for two days and
my blood pressure shot up.”63 When talking about lasting effects, the journalist
stated that the video “broke” her, concluding that the experience was “scarring.” 64
In 2018, a high school student searched her name on Google and discovered
that her face had been inserted into a pornographic video and various photos.65 The
image count was in the hundreds, with her face doctored onto bodies of women in
numerous sexual poses and situations.66 Further, and perhaps even more
disturbing, many of these images contained identifying information, such as her
name, her residence, and her school.67 The impact was both devasting and lasting:
five years after she discovered the deepfakes, she is still being targeted.68
Deepfake videos hosted on three of the world’s largest porn websites alone
have been viewed millions of times.69 Just one deepfake video, a video using Emma
Watson’s face, has been viewed more than 23 million times. 70 And for these
websites, views beget profit. Each video contains ad attachments that generate
revenue with each click, providing little incentive for sites to remove videos such as
these.71 This lack of incentive is dangerous because, as illustrated, nonconsensual
deepfake pornography can have lasting emotional and psychological harms on
women, including violence, harassment, blackmail, and reputational harm.
III. COMPARING PRIVATE TO PUBLIC ACTION
A. Company Action
Companies, researchers, and organizations are recognizing this threat as well.
Cyber-companies such as Truepic and Sensity have created software to detect
deepfakes, with Truepic partnering with social media giant Twitter, software
company Adobe, and mass media company The New York Times to create the
63. Internet ‘Deepfakes’ Threaten Truth and Reality, supra note 62.
64. Id.
65. Pradhan, supra note 41 (citing Ally Foster, Picture Reveals Sickening Online
Secret, NEWS.COM.AU (June
30,
2018,
7:33
AM),
https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/security/teens-google-search-reveals-sickening-onlinesecret-about-herself/news-story/ee9d26010989c4b9a5c6333013ebbef2).
66. Ally Foster, Picture Reveals Sickening Online Secret, NEWS.COM.AU (June 30, 2018, 7:33 AM),
https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/security/teens-google-search-reveals-sickening-onlinesecret-about-herself/news-story/ee9d26010989c4b9a5c6333013ebbef2. The article cited details of the
crime—one example being that she, a high school girl, was put on the cover of two adult movies, with
one movie titled “Treat me like a whore” on the front. These details are uncomfortable to read but
traumatizing for the victim to experience—especially when that victim is a teenager.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Matt Burgess, Deepfake Porn Is Now Mainstream. And Major Sites Are Cashing in, WIRED
(Aug. 27, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/deepfake-porn-websites-videos-law.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Content Authenticity Initiative, which implements Truepic’s deepfake technology
detection to inform and create a standard for digital content provenance.
With the recent developments in deepfake detection technology, do
platforms have an excuse for turning a blind eye? Researchers are desperately
working on tools for these sites because the solution to the threat of deepfakes is
greater than just public knowledge or offender liability: sites that house these
altered images and videos need to mitigate. And these technological developments,
as well as public pressure, are forcing companies to pay attention. Facebook has
evolved from a deepfake policy of deflect and ignore, to a deepfake policy of
blanket removal with limited exceptions.72 Further, other social media sites such as
YouTube, TikTok, and Twitter have followed suit.73
i. Sensity
Sensity is a visual threat intelligence company based in Amsterdam that is
responsible for the deepfake statistics referenced in Part I of this article, as well as
numerous law review papers and journalism articles on the subject.74 Since 2019,
Sensity has released three reports on the state of deepfake technology, discussing
a broad range of subjects in the area.75
In 2021, Sensity released a “detection platform” that monitors over 500
sources that commonly host “malicious deepfakes.” 76 A user can upload their file
onto the platform, or copy and paste a URL to verify its presence in their record of
authenticated videos.77 Sensity promises a detection confidence of “95-99.9%.” 78
Currently, the detection platform can run authenticity tests on both images and
videos, support facial manipulation analysis for images and videos, and “GANgenerated faces” analysis for solely images.79
This resource is valuable because, of the companies discussed, Sensity is the
only company that has developed technology that allows a user to check for
authenticity in real time, with any type of device that has access to the internet. 80

72. See discussion infra Section III.A.iii.
73. See discussion infra Section III.A.iii. Though there are many companies taking action to combat
the risk of deepfakes, this Article touches on the companies that are taking the greatest steps.
74. AJDER ET AL., supra note 1 (finding that the number of deepfake videos on the internet doubled
from 2018 to 2019 and at the time of its release, the web held an estimated 15,000 deepfake videos).
75. Reports, SENSITY, https://sensity.ai/reports/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2021).
76. How to Detect a Deepfake Online, supra note 1.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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ii. Truepic
Another company working to combat the harms of deepfakes is Truepic.
Truepic, founded by Craig Stack, a former Goldman Sachs employee, creates
camera technology for mobile devices. 81 At the outset, Truepic was formed to
combat fraud, such as Craigslist scammers and dating-site predators.82 Truepic’s
biggest clients evolved to insurance companies, who used its technology to verify
that policyholders’ photographs of their flooded homes or broken windshields were
real.83 The company then sought to expand to industries where there is a “trust
gap” and integrate the software into cameras so that “verification can begin the
moment photons enter the lens.”84 Today, the company’s primary mission is to
authenticate digital photos and videos.85
Integrating verification software in cameras is no small step to combat
deepfakes. Since humans are expected to take over 1.4 trillion photos in 2021, with
93.1% of these photos taken using a mobile phone or tablet, 86 the ability to install
software into these devices could prevent smartphones from contributing to
deepfake attacks and hacking. Further, adoption can build a foundation for the
receding trust many currently experience with visual media.
Truepic has already tested its software in a prototype mobile device, which
captures photos or videos with cryptographically-sealed provenance data, creating
what is almost a digital fingerprint.87 The authenticity of these photos or videos can
be verified by recipients and installation does not require the download of a thirdparty app—the code is integrated into the device processor in a secure area that is
home to sensitive tasks, such as fingerprint scanning and mobile payments.88 By
engaging the “secure” camera mode, every photo or video taken yields a digital

81. J.J. McCorvey, This Image-Authentication Startup Is Combating Faux Social Media Accounts,
Doctored
Photos,
Deep
Fakes,
and
More,
FAST COMPANY
(Feb.
19,
2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90299000/truepic-most-innovative-companies-2019.
82. Id. See also About Us: We’re on a Mission to Restore Trust to the Internet, TRUEPIC, [hereinafter
About Us], https://truepic.com/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
83. Joshua Rothman, In the Age of A.I., Is Seeing Still Believing?, The NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/12/in-the-age-of-ai-is-seeing-still-believing.
84. Id.
85. See About Us, supra note 82.
86. Nina Pantic, How Many Photos Will be Taken in 2021?, MYLIO, https://focus.mylio.com/techtoday/how-many-photos-will-be-taken-in-2021 (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
87.
See
Pioneering
Provenance-Based
Media
Authentication,
TRUEPIC,
https://truepic.com/technology/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2021); see also Truepic, Truepic Breakthrough
Charts a Path for Restoring Trust in Photos and Videos at Internet Scale, CISION (Oct. 15, 2020, 8:00 PM),
[hereinafter
Truepic
Breakthrough],
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/truepicbreakthrough-charts-a-path-for-restoring-trust-in-photos-and-videos-at-internet-scale301152998.html.
88. See Truepic Breakthrough, supra note 87.
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photo that contains cryptographic data, tags your photo or video, and authenticates
various features, such as the date and geolocation.89
Truepic has partnered with tech giant Qualcomm to embed its technology into
Qualcomm’s smartphone chip, the Snapdragon 888.90 The launch for these new
chips was in 2021 and are currently available in certain Android devices, such as the
popular Samsung Galaxy S21 models.91
Twitter, Adobe, and The New York Times are also creating a system for
discerning authentic digital photography and videography from manipulated,
named the Content Authenticity Initiative.92 Truepic’s technology will work with this
system to tag and cryptographically encode important distinguishing information.93
Adobe has already released this technology in Adobe Creative Cloud, which uses a
version of the open standard created that will provide the author’s name, location,
and edit history.94
iii. Facebook
Companies such as Facebook have been criticized for their unwillingness to do
more to temper deepfakes. To circle back to the story of the journalist from Part I,
who had a retaliatory nonconsensual deepfake pornographic video go viral, she
asserts that when she spoke with Facebook and Twitter about removing the video,
they refused.95 “The problem was that they were not willing to concede that there
was a problem on their part that their platform was being used to disseminate this
video,” the journalist stated in an interview with The World public radio.96
Months after the interview, in September of 2019, Facebook partnered with
AWS, Microsoft, and others to create a “Deepfake Detection Challenge” to measure
the progress on deepfake detection technology. 97 In this challenge, Facebook
89. See Truepic Breakthrough, supra note 87.
90. About Us, supra note 82.
91. See id.; see also Tuan Do, List of Phones Powered by Qualcomm Snapdragon 888 Processor
Released in 2021, TECHWALLS, https://www.techwalls.com/snapdragon-888-smartphone-list/ (Sept. 21,
2021).
92. Arooj Ahmed, The Truepic Technology and Joint Venture with QUALCOMM May Give You the
Exact Time and Location of a Photo or Video Taken from Your Phone, DIGIT. INFO. WORLD (Oct. 18, 2020,
11:00 PM), https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2020/10/the-truepic-technology-and-joint.html.
93. Id.
94. Will Allen, The Content Authenticity Initiative unveils content attribution tool within Photoshop
and Behance, ADOBE BLOG (Oct. 20, 2020), https://blog.adobe.com/en/publish/2020/10/20/contentauthenticity-initiative-unveils-content-attribution-tool-within-photoshop-behance.html#gs.z3shja; see
also Ahmed, supra note 92.
95. Internet ‘Deepfakes’ Threaten Truth and Reality, supra note 62.
96. Id.
97. See Deepfake Detection Challenge, KAGGLE, https://www.kaggle.com/c/deepfake-detectionchallenge (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); see also Deepfake Detection Challenge Dataset, META AI (June 25,
2020), https://ai.facebook.com/datasets/dfdc/.
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created a dataset with individuals who agreed to the “use and manipulation of their
likenesses.”98 Facebook released this dataset both as part of the challenge and to
the general public in order to “accelerate progress on detecting harmful
manipulated media.”99 This challenge released a public preview dataset, which
consisted of 5,000 videos and two facial modification algorithms, and the black box
dataset, which consisted of 124,000 videos and eight facial modification
algorithms.100 The evaluation of the algorithms created were on an unseen black
box dataset that was home to both organic content found on the internet and new
videos created for the project, consisting of largely tough to classify videos such as
makeup tutorials and paintings.101
This competition was hosted by Kaggle, a subsidiary of Google, and included
a $1 million prize.102 The top-performing model on average achieved 82.56%
precision with the public dataset.103 However, with the black box dataset, the
highest-performing model on average achieved just 65.18% precision. 104 This
discrepancy verifies that a key challenge for detecting deepfakes is generalizing
detection techniques to both known and unforeseen synthetic examples.
In October of 2019, shortly after the creation of the Deepfake Detection
Challenge, the co-founder and CEO of Facebook testified in a House Financial
Services Committee hearing.105 Mark Zuckerberg answered questions on data and
election security issues related to Facebook posts and ads during testimony before
the House Financial Services Committee.106 When criticized for allowing the spread
of a deepfake video containing manipulated media of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
appearing to be inebriated, Zuckerberg conceded that it was a company failure to
not “fact check” the video and that he played a role in the decision not to remove
the video due to company policy.107 During this testimony, Representative Jennifer
Wexton asked a poignant question: “Do you understand there’s a difference
between misinformation and disinformation?” 108 Zuckerberg responded that he did
but that it is hard to determine intent.109
In January of 2020, the social media giant announced its firmest stance against
manipulated media to date, revealing that Facebook will remove manipulated

98. Deepfake Detection Challenge Dataset, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Deepfake Detection Challenge, supra note 97.
103. Deepfake Detection Challenge Dataset, supra note 97.
104. Id.
105. Facebook CEO Testimony before House Financial Services Committee, C-SPAN (Oct. 23,
2019),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?465293-1/facebook-ceo-testimony-house-financial-servicescommittee#.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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media that meet two criteria.110 First, manipulated media will be removed if the
media has been edited or synthesized in ways that an average person would not
recognize or would mislead someone into thinking that a subject of the video
actually said something that, in reality, they did not.111 Second, manipulated media
will be removed if it is the product of AI or machine learning that “merges, replaces
or superimposes content onto a video” to make it appear to be authentic. 112
There are exceptions to this new policy: parody, satire, or videos that have
been edited solely to omit or change the order of the words will remain. 113 Further,
videos that may not fall under the criteria for removal may still be reviewed by
Facebook’s numerous independent third-party fact-checkers.114 If the image or
video is deemed false, distribution will be reduced in users’ News Feed and rejected
if an ad.115 Additionally, those who see it, attempt to share it, or already shared it
will receive a warning that it is false.116
Other social media sites have also recently taken steps to mitigate deepfakes.
In February of 2020, YouTube announced that they will disallow deepfake “electionrelated content.”117 And later that year, TikTok announced that they were removing
all deepfakes “which prohibits synthetic or manipulated content that misleads
users by distorting the truth of events in a way that could cause harm.”118 Finally,
in 2021, Twitter implemented a policy that allows the site to “label Tweets
containing synthetic and manipulated media to help people understand their
authenticity and to provide additional context.”119
B. Federal Action
Legislators are only recently starting to understand and care about the effects
of both revenge porn and deepfake technology. Former President Donald Trump
implemented unprecedented legislation to combat deepfakes in response to

110. Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, META (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media/.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bickert, supra note 110.
117. Leslie Miller, How YouTube Supports Elections, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG: NEWS & EVENTS (Feb. 3,
2020), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/how-youtube-supports-elections?m=1.
118. Vanessa Pappas, Combating Misinformation and Election Interference on TikTok, TIKTOK:
COMPANY (Aug. 5, 2020), https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/combating-misinformation-and-electioninterference-on-tiktok.
119.
Synthetic
and
Manipulated
Media
Policy,
TWITTER:
HELP
CENTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).
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election interference,120 and it appears that current President Joe Biden will be
furthering the fight against deepfakes. In 2021, Representative Yvett Clarke
addressed the Biden administration shortly upon introduction of the DEEPFAKES
Accountability Act: “We’re in a new Congress,” Clarke said about the Biden
administration.121 “There are members in the Congress, both on the Senate and
House side, who recognize what this threat is to our way of life, and how it has
already been used to abuse women.” 122
i. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
Former President Donald Trump signed the first federal law regarding
deepfakes in response to election interference by foreign entities: The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.123 This Act directed the Director of
National Intelligence to produce a comprehensive report on the foreign
weaponization of deepfakes and even created a “deepfakes prize competition” to
encourage research and development of technology to detect deepfakes.124 The
competition provided a $5 million prize for one or more winners.125
This Act detailed reporting requirements for the Director of National
Intelligence, stating that within six months of enactment, the Director is to submit
a report on the potential national security impacts of deepfakes and how foreign
governments are or might use them “to spread disinformation or engage in other
malign activities.”126
For election deepfakes specifically, this Act required the Director to notify the
congressional Intelligence Committees whenever he or she ascertained that there
is credible information or intelligence that a foreign entity has or is utilizing
deepfakes aimed at elections or the political processes of the U.S. 127
ii. IOGAN Act
In one of former President Donald Trump’s last acts as president, he signed
into law the Identifying Outputs of Generative Adversarial Networks Act.128 With
this act, the Director of the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) must support
research on manipulated media and information authenticity, as well as support
120. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 5724, 133
Stat. 1198, 2177-78 (2019) (codified as 50 U.S.C.A. § 3024 (West 2019)).
121. Hao, supra note 3.
122. Id.
123. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 5724, 133
Stat. 1198, 2177-78 (2019) (codified as 50 U.S.C.A. § 3024 (West 2019)).
124. Id. at §§ 5709, 5724.
125. Id. at § 5724.
126. 50 U.S.C.A. § 3369a(a)(1)(B) (West 2019).
127. Id.
128. Identifying Outputs of Generative Adversarial Networks Act, Pub. L. 116-258, 134 Stat. 1150,
1150–52 (2019) (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. § 9202 (West 2020)).

2022

DEEPFAKE PORNOGRAPHY: DETECTING AND
REGULATING THIS RISING THREAT TO PRIVACY

367

research for developing standards to accelerate the development of technology
regarding GANs or other similar media manipulation technology. 129
When describing the bill, the House committee report explained that “the
intent of this legislation is to accelerate the progress of research and the
development of measurements, standards, and tools to combat manipulated media
content, including the outputs of generative adversarial networks.” 130 The
committee encouraged NSF “to continue to fund cross-directorate research
through these programs, and others, to achieve the purposes” of the legislation,
“including social and behavioral research on the ethics of these technologies and
human interaction with the content generated by these technologies.” 131
iii. Non-Deepfake Federal Liability
For a nonconsensual deepfake pornography victim, there are many potential
avenues, but they are not promising. Currently, no federal law criminalizes
nonconsensual deepfake pornography and the criminal options are significantly less
than civil. Civil avenues for nonconsensual deepfake pornography are scarce and
only allow for filing suit against the creator of the deepfake, not the platform that
holds or distributes it.
There is a cyberstalking statute that could be effective, but only if there is an
element of intent.132 A victim may have tort options, but many are written too
narrowly to encompass all victims. A victim may also have a copyright claim if the
deepfake photo or video is from photos or videos the victim took personally, but
questions exist for deepfakes that need to be hashed out, such as exploring who
owns the IP of the synthetic data—the algorithm or writer. Most of these current
legal avenues lack the nuances of AI necessary to be effective.
Law surrounding cyberstalking could provide an avenue to some. 18 U.S.C. §
2261A(1)(B) provides liability if someone uses “any interactive computer service or
electronic communication service or electronic communication system” to engage
in conduct that causes or attempts to cause “substantial emotional distress.”133
However, there is always the argument that the creator lacked the intent needed
to file suit under this law.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress provides a seemingly
simple avenue, but upon further glance is also too narrow to encompass all victims.
This tort provides liability for a victim if “[a]n actor . . . by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to another.”134
The intent requirement can leave out a variety of victims if the creator did not
intend to create the harm. For instance, perhaps the creator never thought the
129. 15 U.S.C.A. § 9202 (West 2020).
130. H.R. REP. NO. 116-268, at 6 (2019).
131. Id.
132. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A(1)(B) (West 2020).
133. Id.
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
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victim would see the deepfake or created the deepfake solely for his or another’s
pleasure.
Privacy-based torts also at first glance seem to provide legal avenues for
victims, but upon further reading require elements that are too narrow for most
cases. The right of privacy is defined as “the right to be let alone,”135 which certainly
can transfer to nonconsensual deepfake pornography; however, it is clear that the
torts described were not written with artificial intelligence in mind. There are three
possible privacy-based torts that one could cite when pursing a tort claim.136
First, the appropriation of name or likeness tort grants an avenue for a legal
remedy if someone “appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another.”137 However, the use must “be of benefit” to the individual using the
likeness.138
Next, the publicity given to private life tort imposes liability on one who “gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another” if the matter publicized
“would be highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate
concern to the public.”139 However, this tort requires that the publicity concern the
private life of the individual.140 There is no liability when the information is already
public.141 So, in many cases when images of someone’s face are taken from their
public social media account, this tort would not be a viable option.
Lastly, the publicity placing person in false light tort punishes “one who gives
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in
a false light” if the false light would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person”
and “the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.”142
While this tort could work in some instances, if the video or image is noticeably
manipulated or has a label stating that it has been manipulated, this tort would not
be of use.
As seen, these privacy-based torts at first glance seem to provide legal
remedies to the victim, but further reading informs that they were drafted too
narrowly to encompass many of the issues of AI. The elements for the three torts
listed—such as necessary benefit, that the image taken to create the deepfake be
“private,” and that the deepfake must appear to be true—provide too narrow of a
road for many victims to explore.

135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1977).
136. See id. § 652A.
137. Id. § 652C.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 652D.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. B (AM. L. INST. 1977).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 652E.
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Copyright claims may also exist, but only if the image used to make the
deepfake was taken by the victim. 143 However, if the created material was
“transformative,” then this option disappears.144 The U.S. Copyright Office of Fair
Use stated that “[t]ransformative uses are those that add something new, with a
further purpose or different character, and do not substitute for the original use of
the work.”145 A creator could easily argue that taking a photograph and
manipulating it into a nonconsensual deepfake pornography video is indeed
transformative. One would be hard-pressed to find a deepfake that does not add
something new, which is why it is called manipulated media.
iv. Pending Legislation
In 2019, Representative Yvett Clarke introduced the DEEPFAKES
Accountability Act.146 This Act would require creators of synthetic media that
contain the likeness of a person to disclose that the video has been manipulated,
using
“irremovable
digital
watermarks,
as
well
as
textual
descriptions.”147 Importantly, this act would allow victims to sue the creators and
“vindicate their reputations” in court.148 However, this Act, while a step in the right
direction, contains loopholes that must be addressed.149 Creators of harmful
deepfakes usually preserve anonymity, so harmful media with anonymous creators
will likely disregard the watermark requirement.150 Further, even if there is a
watermark attached, they are relatively easy to remove.151 As one writer explained,
“[t]ext can be cropped, logos removed (via more smart algorithms), and even a
sophisticated whole-frame watermark might be eliminated simply by being reencoded for distribution on Instagram or YouTube.” 152
Next, in March of 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to
reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act, a bill designed to protect victims of

143. More Information on Fair Use, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/moreinfo.html (May 2021).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation Subject
to Accountability Act, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. (2019) (this bill has not yet been brought for a vote).
147. Id. § 1041(a)(1).
148. Id. § 1041(f).
149. Id.
150. Ashley Dean, Deepfakes, Pose Detection, and the Death of “Seeing is Believing,” LAW TECH.
TODAY (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2020/08/deepfakes-pose-detection-andthe-death-of-seeing-is-believing/.
151. Devin Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act Would Impose Unenforceable Rules—
But It’s a Start, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/deepfakesaccountability-act-would-impose-unenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start/.
152. Id.
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domestic violence and sexual assault.153 This amendment included a ban on
knowingly or recklessly distributing “intimate visual depictions” of individuals
without their consent.154 Offenders would face up to two years in prison for each
individual victim depicted.155 This would be the first U.S. federal law that attempts
to seriously address online nonconsensual pornography. 156 “Writing and passing
VAWA is one of the legislative accomplishments of which I’m most proud,” Biden
said in the statement.157 “VAWA has transformed the way our country responds to
violence against women.”158 This bill, while a positive step forward for
nonconsensual pornography, is a missed opportunity to provide for the deepfake
subset of this crime.
C. State Action
In the United States, forty-eight states, Washington D.C., and Guam have
some variant of a ban on nonconsensual pornography, and only Virginia and
California have a nonconsensual pornography variant that includes faked and
deepfaked media.159 Approximately a dozen states have legislation pending, though
nearly all legislation is civil and addresses “actual malice related to the intent to
deceive and the knowledge of deceivery.”160 So, to file a suit against a deepfake
creator, the deepfake would have to not only be deceptive, but the creator must
have intended to deceive.
i. Virginia
To address the disproportionate number of deepfakes in the form of nonconsensual pornography with female victims, Virginia expanded its ban on nonconsensual pornography to images of people “whose image was used in creating,
adapting, or modifying a videographic or still image with the intent to depict an
actual person and who is recognizable as an actual person by the person's face,
153. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021, H.R. 1620, 117th Cong. (2021).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Adi Robertson, A Federal ‘Revenge Porn’ Ban Could Transform Online Harassment Laws, THE
VERGE (Apr. 15, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/15/22340260/vawa-shield-actrevenge-porn-first-amendment-questions.
157. Statement by President Biden on the Passage of the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2021 in the House of Representatives (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/17/statement-bypresident-biden-on-the-passage-of-the-violence-against-women-reauthorization-act-of-2021-in-thehouse-of-representatives/.
158. Id.
159. See 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200722180154/https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2021); see also PROCHASKA ET AL., supra note 37.
160. PROCHASKA ET AL., supra note 37.
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likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic.” 161 With the passage of this
legislation, Virginia became the first state to impose criminal penalties for the
distribution of nonconsensual deepfake pornography.162
ii. California
On October 3, 2019, California enacted two new laws that regulate the
distribution of deepfakes: A.B. 602 and 730.163 A.B. 602 is tailored to nonconsensual
deepfake pornography, and broadly allows victims to prosecute creators for
damages.164 A plaintiff can recover disgorgement of profits, economic and
noneconomic damages, and statutory damages up to $150,000 if the act was
“committed with malice.”165 However, this is a small sum for what could be a lifealtering event.
As noted, a study from Sensity found that ninety-six percent of deepfakes
online are sexually explicit, but what has not been discussed is that ninety-nine
percent of these women were or are currently entertainment professionals.166 The
Screen Actors Guild, a union that represents film, TV, and other media
professionals, praised Governor Newsom for the bill, citing a step towards
protecting women. “We are absolutely thrilled that Governor Newsom stood by the
victims, most of whom are women, of non-consensual pornography by signing A.B.
602 into law,” Gabrielle Carteris, president of the union, told Deadline. 167 “Every
person deserves the basic human right to live free from image-based sexual
abuse.”168
Next, A.B. 730 addresses elections, and grants political candidates for public
office an avenue to prosecute individuals or organizations that maliciously
distribute “materially deceptive” media about any candidate within sixty days of an

161. See H.D. 2678, 2019 Gen. Assemb., (Va. 2018) (amending VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (2019));
see also Matthew F. Ferraro, Deepfake Legislation: A Nationwide Survey—State and Federal Lawmakers
Consider Legislation to Regulate Manipulated Media, WILMERHALE (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190925-deepfake-legislation-a-nationwidesurvey.
162. Ferraro, supra note 161.
163. See Assemb. 602, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1708.85–
86 (2020)); see also Assemb. 730, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20010(a)
(2020)).
164. See Assemb. 602, (amending CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1708.85–86 (2020).
165. Id.
166. AJDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
167. David Robb, SAG-AFTRA Commends Gov. Newsom for Signing “DeepFakes” Bill, DEADLINE
(Oct.
3,
2019),
https://deadline.com/2019/10/sag-aftra-commends-gov-newsom-for-signingdeepfakes-bill-1202752095/.
168. Id.
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election.169 Victims can pursue both damages and equitable relief, such as an
injunction to dissemination of the deepfake. 170 There is no liability for print of online
media paid to disseminate the deepfake as long as the site provides a disclosure
with the media stating that it has been manipulated.171 The bill also contains
exceptions for deceptive media that can be considered satire.172 The bill is set to
sunset on January 1, 2023.173
Both of these laws have exceptions in place to alleviate First Amendment
infringements. A.B. 730 does not alter protections under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, nor does it apply to satire, and it allows for websites
or radio and television stations to circumvent liability if there is a disclaimer
informing the reader of the manipulation.174 Similarly, A.B. 602 asserts that a
creator cannot be held liable for creating or publishing manipulated content that is
a “matter of legitimate public concern,” if the media is of “political or newsworthy
value,” or within state or federal protections for “commentary or criticism.” 175
Nevertheless, this bill has faced criticism for its restriction on free speech from
organizations like the ACLU of California and the California Broadcasters
Association.176 Mark Powers, Vice President of the California Broadcasters
Association, said the bill would be impossible to comply with.177 “By passing this bill,
you put your broadcasters in jeopardy,” Powers told the Senate Elections and
Constitutional Amendments Committee. 178 This puts broadcasters in a tough
position where if fact-checking a political ad proves to be too costly, they may
choose not to run ads at all to avoid potential liability.179 California News Publishers
Association Staff Attorney Whitney Prout stated the bill was “an ineffective and
frankly unconstitutional solution that causes more problems than it solves,” noting
that A.B. 730 would impose restrictions on speech that must survive strict
scrutiny.180
There is truth to these concerns. A.B. 730 would likely ban altering content to
reenact true events that were not filmed or recorded and could prohibit a

169. See Assemb. 730, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20010(a)
(2020)).
170. Id.
171. Assemb. 730, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Assemb. 602, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1708.86
(2020)).
176. Nick Cahill, Bill to Fight ‘Deepfake’ Videos Advances in California, Despite Free-Speech Fears,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 2, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/bill-to-fight-deepfake-videosadvances-in-california-despite-free-speech-fears/.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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candidate’s use of altered videos of him or herself. 181 Additionally, A.B. 602 could
impose liability for content viewed by only the creator and lacks clarification for
when consent is revoked after creation or distribution.182
Marc Berman, the California assembly member who introduced AB. 730,
addressed concerns about A.B. 730, while also offering a judicial counterpoint.183 “I
understand that there are significant First Amendment concerns with the bill as it
is currently drafted, and I’m committed to working through these issues,” Berman
said.184 “I would note however, that I haven’t seen a court determine that the First
Amendment grants someone the right to literally put their words into my mouth,
which is what this technology does.”185
iii. Texas
Texas has deepfake legislation, but only narrowly tailored to elections. 186
Texas imposes penalties on the creation or distribution of deepfake videos intended
to harm candidates for public office or influence elections. 187 S.B. 751 makes it a
Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year in the county jail and a fine of
$4,000, for a person to “create[] a deepfake video” and “cause[] the deepfake video
to be published or distributed within 30 days of an election,” if the person does so
with the “intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election.” 188
The Texas Senate Research Center released an analysis on the bill,
acknowledging that deepfake technology “likely cannot be constitutionally banned
altogether,” but concluded that “it can be narrowly limited to avoid what may be
its greatest potential threat: the electoral process.”189 This statement is valid.
Though banning deepfakes would solve many of the issues discussed, it would be a
blatant disregard for First Amendment rights, as well as the benefits that deepfakes
provide. A legislative solution must be drafted that is not too broad as to cause
181. See Assemb. 730, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20010(a)
(West 2020)); see also K.C. Halm et al., Two New California Laws Tackle Deepfake Videos in Politics and
Porn, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/insights/2019/10/californiadeepfakes-law.
182. See Assemb. 602, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1708.86
(West 2020)); see also K.C. Halm et al., supra note 181.
183. Cahill, supra note 176.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. S. 751, 86th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (amending TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West
2019)). Maryland, Maine, and Washington also have proposed deepfake election legislation. Matthew
Feeney, Deepfake Laws Risk Creating More Problems Than They Solve, REGUL. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Mar.
1, 2021), https://regproject.org/paper/deepfake-laws-risk-creating-more-problems-than-they-solve/.
187. S. 751, 86th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019); Feeney, supra note 186, at 6.
188. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (West 2021).
189.
Hughes,
Bill
Analysis,
SENATE
RSCH.
CTR.
(June
12,
2019)
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/analysis/html/SB00751F.htm.
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constitutional distress, but not too narrow, such as this Texas legislation, as to bar
a remedy for a large subset of victims.
IV. EXAMINING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The current roadmap for victims of nonconsensual deepfake pornography is
cloudy at best. A nationwide ban on deepfakes would be the most effective solution
to the issues discussed, but this is not possible and would create more issues than
remedies. Implementing a ban such as that would be a suffocation of the freedom
of expression that Americans have a fundamental right to. Similarly, an injunction
against deepfakes likely infringes on the Constitution’s First Amendment. 190 But
what if the legislation drafted was not a blanket ban on deepfakes, but solely for
nonconsensual deepfake pornography, with the possible extension for other
pressing issues, such as intentional election interference?
As seen above, current legislation targeting deepfakes is too narrow, with
most efforts focusing solely on election issues, and current legislation for platform
protections which is too broad.191 Future legislation must balance the interests of
free speech and encouragement for technological advancements with the interests
of privacy. To find this balance and address the necessary issues of manipulated
media separate from the narrow lens of elections, legislators must work with
experts in the technology industry, the field of cybersecurity law, and academia to
address all of the necessary nuances, so that no victim falls through the cracks. This
solution must focus on ensuring companies are making the detection of deepfakes
a priority, as well as removing harmful manipulated videos from their platform and
holding the creators accountable.
State laws alone are not reliable nor effective due to the nature of the internet
as a national and global force.192 Federal legislation must be drafted to truly be
190. For a comprehensive analysis of potential permissible injunctions regarding deepfakes, see
Jessica Ice, Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 417 (2019).
191. See supra notes 123–89.
192. The rationale behind why a federal law would be the most effective solution rather than
state specific legislation mirrors the rationale for why an international standard would be more effective
than a nation-wide standard. Simply put, the internet is not confined to just one state or, in most cases,
one country. For an example of how the wide reach of a current international privacy standard can be
utilized to regulate deepfakes, see Martijn van der Helm, Harmful Deepfakes and the GDPR (Dec. 10,
2021) (M.A. thesis, Tilburg University), http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=156861.
Currently, there is no global standard, though there is some international liability. Former
President Barack Obama amended Executive Order 13964 to forbid foreign entities from using cyberenabled means to “[t]amper with, alter, or cause a misappropriation of information with the purpose or
effect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions.” Obama used this Order to
impose sanctions against Russia, as did former President Donald Trump. Press Release, Office of the
Press Secretary, Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-actions-responserussian-malicious-cyber-activity-and.
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effective, and tech giants must step up to mitigate. If a solution can be found for
this issue of nonconsensual deepfake pornography, which encompasses the vast
majority of deepfakes, then this will open doors to extend legislation or
technological advances to other harmful deepfake subsets, such as election
interference.
A. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) shaped the internet into what it is
today. The CDA is a federal law that was passed in 1996 and regulates pornography
on the internet, as well as protects websites from liability for content posted by
their users.193 Under Section 230 of the CDA, the owners of internet services and
websites are not regarded as the publishers of the content that their users post.194
As such, there is no legal obligation to remove nonconsensual pornography, or
nonconsensual deepfake pornography, unless it violates copyright or federal
criminal laws.195
The purpose behind Section 230 was to allow website owners to moderate
their websites without concern for legal liability, as part of a larger initiative to
enable growth of the internet.196 However, the landscape of the internet has
changed, and this concern is no longer relevant. Section 230 as it reads currently is
overly broad, protecting both good and bad actors.197 Consequently, aside from
While this Article agrees that international liability is needed, the United States must also work
with other countries to impose standards and regulations regarding deepfakes. The United States is not
the only country feeling the effects—other countries are hearing outcries from their citizens and
implementing legislation of their own. See e.g., #MyImageMyChoice is A Coalition of Survivors and
Advocates Calling for Reform in Law and Government Policy on Image-Based Sexual Abuse, ELIZABETH
WOODWARD, https://elizabethwoodward.com/work/myimagemychoice/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2022); see
also, e.g., Julian Ryall, ‘Deepfakes’ Rattle South Korea’s Tech Culture, DW (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.dw.com/en/deepfakes-rattle-south-koreas-tech-culture/a-56310213. The United States
should work with these countries to adopt a more uniform approach to deepfakes because the internet
is global, with the need for global solutions.
Further analysis of international liability is beyond the scope of this Article.
193. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/faqs/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (choose “[a]ren’t civil and copyright
remedies adequate to address this conduct?” to expand text).
194. 47 U.S.C § 230.
195. Id.
196. See Alexander F. Magee, Back Against the Wall: Are Section 230’s Days Numbered?, WAKE
FOREST L. REV.: CURRENT ISSUES BLOG, http://www.wakeforestlawreview.com/2020/10/back-against-thewall-are-section-230s-days-numbered/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); see also Ashley Johnson & Daniel
Castro, Overview of Section 230: What it is, Why it Was Created, and What it Has Achieved, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND. (Feb. 22, 2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/02/22/overview-section-230what-it-why-it-was-created-and-what-it-has-achieved.
197. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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public disapproval, there is little incentive for online platforms to monitor or
remove harmful media. An amendment would modernize the statute and mitigate
the harm that is a consequence of the current lack of platform incentive.
i. Amending Section 230
The strength in Section 230 derives from its treatment as an absolute
exemption from almost every civil federal law. Currently, Section 230 shields sites
against civil suits and state laws.198 Section 230 does not explicitly prohibit states
from enforcing their own “consistent” laws but does not allow enforcement if the
laws are “inconsistent” with Section 230.199 In both Voicenet Communications, Inc.
v. Corbett and Backpage v. McKenna, the courts reinforced that online platforms
are not liable under state criminal laws deemed inconsistent.200 Similarly, in Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBil LLC, the court held that online platforms are not liable under state
intellectual property laws deemed inconsistent.201 And recently, the second circuit
in Domen v. Vimeo applied Section 230 immunity in the context of removing
content on an online platform, as opposed to simply allowing the content on the
site.202 This is the first circuit court of appeal to make a decision applying Section
230 as a basis for immunity during the pleading stage, denying opportunity for
discovery.203
As illustrated, Section 230 grants great power to platforms. The reason this
statute in particular is detrimental to deepfake victims is that in many instances,
the creators of deepfakes are hard to find.204 This leaves limited avenues for a victim
to pursue legal remedies through other means, such as suing the platform holding
or disseminating the media. Utilizing or amending Section 230 to impose platform
liability is arguably the most efficient and effective solution to this issue.
The arguments against Section 230 have included both an amendment and an
abolishment all together.205 In December of 2019, then former Vice-President and
198. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 193.
199. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
200. Voicenet Commc’ns, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04-1318, 2006 WL 2506318 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006);
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
201. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007).
202. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 6 F.4th 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2021).
203. Fenwick & West LLP, Second Circuit Affirms Video Sharing Site’s Immunity from Suit Under
CDA Section 230 for Removal of User Content, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2279bc78-8906-44bc-8371-388c1ff46ee2.
204. Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1792 (2019) (discussing a lack of metadata
available to identify a creator, technology available to ensure anonymity, and jurisdictional restraints).
205. The New York Times Editorial Board, Joe Biden: Former Vice President of the United States,
N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joebiden-nytimes-interview.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share (Interview conducted on Dec. 16, 2019) (Former
Vice President Biden, discussing C.D.A. 230, stated that “[i]t should be revoked because it is not merely
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now current President Joe Biden stated that Section 230 should be abolished
completely, explaining that for Facebook and other platforms, Section 230 “should
be revoked because it is not merely an internet company. It is propagating
falsehoods they know to be false.”206
However, an abolishment would negate the valid uses of Section 230. For
instance, sites such as Wikipedia, which host user contributions and volunteer
editors, as well as blogs, and online business reviews, would not exist without
Section 230’s liability shield.207 For some of these sites, such as Facebook where
1.91 billion people log in daily, it can be nearly impossible to regulate with 100%
accuracy.208 Without Section 230’s shield, companies, especially start-ups, would
falter under legal expenses. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, without Section 230,
start-ups would face “death by ten thousand duck-bites” defending lawsuits.209 For
context, for each case that reaches the discovery stage, a start-up is forced to pay
anywhere from $100,000 to $500,000 defending against the lawsuit.210
An amendment to Section 230 is not impossible. Section 230 has previously
been amended due to public interest and a concern for safety, opening the door for
an amendment regarding nonconsensual deepfake pornography. In 2018, the
statute was amended to address sex trafficking by broadly expanding prosecutorial
power over companies used by sex workers for their business.211 Unlike the new
legislation drafted in and contested in Ashcroft, this amendment to Section 230 was
successful and passed both the House and Senate with overwhelming bipartisan
support.212 As a result, platforms can no longer be used for assisting, supporting, or
facilitating sex trafficking and are thus held accountable for third-party activity
regarding sex trafficking or prostitution.213 The amendment also contains

an internet company.”); see also Rachel Lerman, Social Media Liability Law is Likely to Be Reviewed Under
Biden,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
18,
2021,
8:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/18/biden-section-230/ (“Democrats also think the
law should be amended . . . .”).
206. The New York Times Editorial Board, supra note 205.
207. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230.
208. Dan Noyes, The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics – Q2 2021, ZEPHORIA,
https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/ (July 28, 2021) (“1.91 billion people on
average log onto Facebook daily and are considered daily active users . . . .”).
209. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th
Cir. 2008).
210.
Section
230:
Cost
Report,
ENGINE,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571681753c44d835a440c8b5/t/5c8168cae5e5f04b9a30e84e/1
551984843007/Engine_Primer_230cost2019.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2022).
211. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132
Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(d) (2018)).
212. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017.
213. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017.
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retroactive provisions, allowing prosecutors to pursue posts or other means
deemed to assist, support, or facilitate sex trafficking or prostitution that were
created before the law was passed.214
Amending the statute provided platforms an incentive to take a closer look at
their sites and self-censor to ensure that they were abiding by the law. For example,
shortly after the legislation passed through Congress, Craigslist preemptively
removed their Personals section,215 Reddit removed several forums related to sex
work,216 and Tumblr banned “adult content” within months of the passage of FOSTA
and just days after the app was removed from Apple’s iOS App Store over a child
pornography incident.217
It can be argued that the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”) contains
First Amendment concerns that are tougher to navigate than the Section 230
amendment this Article advocates for. Namely, FOSTA is tailored to discriminate
against specific content and a specific viewpoint: the promotion of sex trafficking
and prostitution.218 So, it prohibits speech promoting prostitution and sex work
views. Conversely, an amendment to protect victims from having their images
manipulated into deepfake pornography is not tailored to discriminate against a
viewpoint. There could be a counterargument that the amendment proposed
concerns a restriction on subject-matter, but the broader subject of deepfakes will
not be barred. Further, the Supreme Court has held that content-based restrictions
will nevertheless be treated as content neutral if they are designed to prevent the
speech’s adverse secondary effects, which is the case here. 219
This amendment could start with targeting nonconsensual deepfake
pornography, with the goal to expand to all nonconsensual deepfakes. The
amendment should ensure that platforms are no longer shielded unless they take
reasonable measures to prevent and remove nonconsensual deepfake
pornography, as well as utilize emerging technology. Similar to how companies
must take reasonable measures to keep customer information safe, they should
take reasonable measures to prevent and remove nonconsensual deepfakes.
Additionally, these platforms should hold the creators of these deepfakes
accountable, such as a suspension of their account or an outright ban.

214. Id.
215. About: FOSTA, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/FOSTA (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
216. Annamarya Scaccia, SESTA Is Already Having Devastating Impacts on Sex Workers—Just Like
They
Predicted
(Updated),
REWIRE
NEWS
(Apr.
2,
2018,
5:33
PM),
https://rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2018/04/02/sesta-already-devastating-impacts-sex-workersjust-like-predicted/.
217. Shannon Liao, Tumblr Will Ban All Adult Content on December 17th, THE VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018,
12:26 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18123752/tumblr-adult-content-porn-ban-dateexplicit-changes-why-safe-mode.
218. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017.
219. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986).
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B. New Legislation
Currently, Section 230 shields sites against civil suits and state laws but does
not shield from federal criminal charges.220 So, in theory the federal government
could simply pass legislation making nonconsensual deepfake pornography a
criminal offense. However, this could prove difficult, as shown in Ashcroft and how
that holding related to the CPPA.221
In 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”). 222
This Act prohibited actual child pornography, as well as virtual, defining “child
pornography” as including a “computer-generated image or picture” that “appears
to be” or “conveys the impression that the material is . . . of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”223 The lawmakers behind this Act believed that by
passing this law and cutting off access to child focused pornographic material, even
if not actual children, would decrease incidents of child abuse, as well as real child
pornography.224 However, this was contested in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
with the court finding the statute overbroad, explaining that the government
cannot prohibit speech simply because the speech “increases the chance an
unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’”225
Next, the government argued that virtual images must be prohibited in order
to eliminate the market for child pornography because they are indistinguishable
from real images.226 The court found this argument “implausible,” reasoning that
“[i]f virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images
would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional,
computerized images would suffice.”227 The court also explained that courts have
banned child pornography because there was a “proximate link to the crime from
which it came,” elaborating that “the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime
and creates no victims by its production.”228
This holding, however, arose before deepfakes increased in prominence and
technology advanced. If this case were decided today, it may produce a different
result due to the indistinguishable comparison of deepfakes today from real media,
and the fact that they are of real people. And if the coin was flipped, the logic used
220. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 193.
221. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002).
222. H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. (1996) (codified as 18 U.S.C.A. 2252A).
223. Id.
224. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241–42 (2002); see also John Schwartz, New Law Expanding Legal
Definition of Child Pornography Definition of Child Pornography Draws Fire, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/10/04/new-law-expanding-legal-definitionof-child-pornography-draws-fire/3259a7d5-3349-4b4b-a49a-f2d1ba534019/.
225. Ashcroft 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
226. Id. at 254.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 236.
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by lawmakers in Ashcroft could be mirrored concerning nonconsensual deepfake
pornography with adult victims as well, amplified by the reality that real
nonconsensual pornography229 is also a pressing issue.230 The court’s reasoning in
Ashcroft simply would not translate for nonconsensual deepfake pornography,
because the creator is using someone’s actual images, their likeness, to create this
pornography. A real victim exists.
Much can be learned from the passage and abolishment of this Act—it is
smart to be mindful that solutions must be tailored as to not opine on future harms,
but instead focus on present threats, and to stress that there are real victims in the
world of nonconsensual deepfake pornography, with lasting impacts and few
remedies. If litigation was passed, the most effective solution is a federal statute,
as states are constrained by the restrictions imposed by Section 230. 231 And Section
230 aside, if new proposed legislation is contested, courts will have to weigh
preventing harm against free speech concerns, while acknowledging a public
interest in protecting people’s privacy, and chilling speech.
A completely new law could be created, yes, or existing tort law be modified
with AI in mind. As described in Part II, there are tort avenues currently available—
but as they currently read, they are detrimentally narrow.232 One solution could be
the removal of the intent requirement for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort, or the benefit element for appropriation of name or likeness,
specifically when dealing with pornographic deepfakes. Amending tort law may be
perfect timing. The “Defamation and Privacy” section of the Restatement Third of
Torts is currently being drafted.233 However, to avoid a clash with Section 230 as it
currently reads, an amendment to the Act would nevertheless have to accompany
a new law.
C. Regulation
There is no agency that deepfakes cleanly fall under, though debates tend to
be divided between the three options briefly discussed below. Scholars writing in
this subject matter have already begun the debate concerning which agency should
regulate deepfakes.234
The first agency that could potentially regulate deepfakes is The Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”). The FCC regulates broadcasting
229. Also known as “revenge porn.”
230. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241–42 (2002).
231. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
232. See supra Part II.
233. Richard Revesz, Completing the Restatement Third of Torts, THE AM. L. INST. (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/completing-restatement-third-torts/.
234. Proposed agencies for regulation of deepfakes warrant additional exploration and are
beyond the scope of this Article. This topic is subject to thoughtful scholarship by others. See, e.g., Anne
P. Gieseke, “The New Weapon of Choice”: Law’s Current Inability to Properly Address Deepfake
Pornography, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1479 (2020); see also Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Deep Fakes: A
Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2019).
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communications and is the “primary authority” on issues including
“communications law, regulation and technological innovation.” 235 The FCC has
rules in place for false information for television and radio, but the jury is out on
whether they can or are willing to extend these regulations to the internet.236
Notably, the FCC has never said that platforms like Facebook should be included in
telecommunications.237 To muddle the issue further, the passage of the Restoring
Internet Freedom Order, which removed net neutrality protections, was the FCC
stepping back from regulating internet, suggesting they do not desire to embrace
the internet under their umbrella of authority.238
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is another option. The FTC protects
consumers and competition by preventing “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair
business practices.”239 Deepfakes certainly can be deceptive, so there is an
argument here for the FTC to take these on. Additionally, the FTC hosts an online
complaint process where individuals can report “fraud, scams, and bad business
practices.”240 The agency lists “identity theft,” as well as “computers, the internet
and online privacy” as topics able to be reported.241 Nonconsensual deepfake
pornography is arguably a mix of the two topics.
Lastly, this problem is incredibly complex, which could warrant a new agency,
specifically tailored to regulate artificial intelligence or for the internet as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
The threat from deepfakes is not hypothetical. Deepfakes are here to stay,
and the impact is global. As illustrated, nonconsensual deepfake pornography can
have lasting emotional and psychological harms, including violence, harassment,
blackmail, and harm to one’s reputation.
The current legal landscape for victims of deepfake videos has not kept up
with technology, and what few laws have been passed largely focus on political
concerns without consideration for the most prominent deepfake category:
nonconsensual deepfake pornography. Legislation must be drafted that balances
preventing and punishing serious harms and limiting free expression. This solution
must focus on ensuring companies are making the detection of deepfakes a priority,
as well as removing harmful manipulated videos from their platform and holding
the creators accountable. There must also be an increase in how quickly
nonconsensual pornography deepfakes can be detected and removed across
235. What We Do, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do (last
visited Apr. 27, 2021).
236. See generally 47 C.F.R.
237. Id.
238. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018).
239. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
240. Report Fraud to the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumerprotection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
241. Id.
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varying platforms. With how quickly an image can travel, the damage is usually
done before sites can remove them.
The only way to combat deepfakes is by bringing together experts in varying
fields to create technology to combat this threat, as well as the government utilizing
its influence to spread public awareness for deepfakes and pass legislation for
nonconsensual deepfake mitigation. Platforms must be aligned regarding methods
of removal and prevention and ensuring they are staying informed on technological
advancements for deepfake detection. Deepfake technology is continually evolving,
so there will be a need for constant updates. Legislators, companies, and experts in
various fields necessary for deepfake advisement and prevention must work
together to address this issue before the harm and erosion of public trust in images
and videos is irreversible.

